Particularists in ethics emphasize that the normative is holistic, and invite us to infer with them that it therefore defies generalization. This has been supposed to present an obstacle to traditional moral theorizing, to have striking implications for moral epistemology and moral deliberation, and to rule out reductive theories of the normative, making it a bold and important thesis across the areas of normative theory, moral epistemology, moral psychology, and normative metaphysics. Though particularists emphasize the importance of the holism of (...) the normative, however, it is not something that they have been able to explain. In this paper I’ll show how to use a small number of simple and, I’ll argue, independently compelling assumptions in order to both predict and explain the holistic features of the normative with respect to the non-normative. The basic idea of the paper is simple. It is that normative claims are holistic because they are general, rather than because they defy generalization. (shrink)

Reasons First explores the hypothesis that reasons have a basic explanatory role in ethics and epistemology. While widely accepted concerning moral worth, Schroeder argues that this idea also illuminates some long-standing puzzles to do with knowledge.

The author wishes to add the following correction to his paper published in Philosophies [1]:The repeated fragment from lines 13–18 and part of 19 on page 69 should be deleted [...].

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION Philosophy originates in man's amazement over the richness and complexity of reality. It attempts to articulate in words and ...

Thomas Pogge answers the question if the capability approach can be justified with a firm ‘no’. Amongst others, he ridicules capability theorists for demanding compensation for each and every possible natural difference between people, including hair types. Not only does Pogge, so this paper argues, misconstrue the difference between the capability approach and Rawlsian resourcism. Even worse: he is actually implicitly relying on the idea of capabilities in his defence of the latter. According to him the resourcist holds that the (...) institutional order should not be biased towards the average person or the needs of some. Yet, as his own case of blind people and traffic lights can illustrate, whether or not this is the case is impossible to assess without resorting to some concept like people’s capabilities. Secondly, it is argued that the real issue at stake is not at all the best metric of justice—primary goods or capabilities—but rather the scope of theories of justice. On the surface the difference of opinion seems to be how to deal with so-called “personal heterogeneities”, yet the discussed case of interpersonal differences in metabolism and communal land-use choices hints at something else; Whereas Pogge insists that questions of justice only concern the institutional structure of society, many capability theorists support the inclusion of culture and social practices as possible sources of injustice. Unfortunately Pogge does not properly acknowledge this, as right from the start of his paper he frames the debate between both approaches in terms of institutions only. (shrink)

Like much in this book, the title and dust jacket illustration are clever. The first evokes Hume's remark in the Treatise that ‘Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.’ The second, which represents a cross between a dance-step and a clinch, links up with the title and anticipates an example used throughout the book to support its central claims: that Ronnie, unlike Bradley, has a reason to go to a party – namely, that there will (...) be dancing at the party – because Ronnie, unlike Bradley, loves dancing. So, the explanation of why Ronnie's and Bradley's reasons differ lies in their respective psychologies.Schroeder argues for a version of the Humean Theory of Reasons he calls Hypotheticalism, which says that every reason is explained by a desire in the same way as Ronnie's is. Schroeder argues that on almost every count, Hypotheticalism is as good as, or preferable to, the Humean and non-Humean alternatives; and he defends it against an array of objections. For example, he explains that while Hypotheticalism claims that ‘desires have to serve in the explanation of every reason because desires are part of the correct analysis of reasons’, it does not claim that a desire that explains a reason is part of that reason: rather it is a background condition for it. This, Schroeder argues, allows him to rebut a variety of objections that depend on conflating reasons with their background conditions. Other …. (shrink)

This open access book offers insights into the development of the ground-breaking Global Code of Conduct for Research in Resource-Poor Settings (GCC) and the San Code of Research Ethics. Using a new, intuitive moral framework predicated on fairness, respect, care and honesty, both codes target ethics dumping – the export of unethical research practices from a high-income setting to a lower- or middle-income setting. The book is a rich resource of information and argument for any research stakeholder who opposes double (...) standards in research. It will be indispensable for applicants to European Union framework programmes, as the GCC is now a mandatory reference document for EU funding. (shrink)

Accountability and responsibility are key concepts in the academic and societal debate on Autonomous Weapon Systems, but these notions are often used as high-level overarching constructs and are not operationalised to be useful in practice. “Meaningful Human Control” is often mentioned as a requirement for the deployment of Autonomous Weapon Systems, but a common definition of what this notion means in practice, and a clear understanding of its relation with responsibility and accountability is also lacking. In this paper, we present (...) a definition of these concepts and describe the relations between accountability, responsibility, control and oversight in order to show how these notions are distinct but also connected. We focus on accountability as a particular form of responsibility—the obligation to explain one’s action to a forum—and we present three ways in which the introduction of Autonomous Weapon Systems may create “accountability gaps”. We propose a Framework for Comprehensive Human Oversight based on an engineering, socio-technical and governance perspective on control. Our main claim is that combining the control mechanisms at technical, socio-technical and governance levels will lead to comprehensive human oversight over Autonomous Weapon Systems which may ensure solid controllability and accountability for the behaviour of Autonomous Weapon Systems. Finally, we give an overview of the military control instruments that are currently used in the Netherlands and show the applicability of the comprehensive human oversight Framework to Autonomous Weapon Systems. Our analysis reveals two main gaps in the current control mechanisms as applied to Autonomous Weapon Systems. We have identified three first options as future work for the design of a control mechanism, one in the technological layer, one in the socio-technical layer and one the governance layer, in order to achieve comprehensive human oversight and ensure accountability over Autonomous Weapon Systems. (shrink)

Community acceptance still remains a challenge for wind energy projects. The most popular explanation for local opposition, the Not in My Backyard effect, has received fierce criticism in the past decade. Critics argue that opposition is not merely a matter of selfishness or ignorance, but that moral, ecological and aesthetic values play an important role. In order to better take such values into account, a more bottom-up, participatory decision process is usually proposed. Research on this topic focusses on either stakeholder (...) motivations/attitudes, or their behavior during project implementation. This paper proposes a third research focus, namely the ‘objects’ which elicit certain behavioral responses and attitudes—the wind turbine and parks. More concretely, this paper explores Value Sensitive Design as way to arrive at wind turbines and parks that better embed or reflect key values. After a critical discussion of the notion of acceptance versus acceptability and support, the paper discusses existing literature on ecology and aesthetics in relation to wind turbine/park design, which could serve as ‘building blocks’ of a more integral VSD approach of the topic. It also discusses the challenge of demarcating wind park projects as VSD projects. A further challenge is that VSD has been applied mainly at the level of technical artifacts, whereas wind parks can best be conceptualized as socio-technical system. This new application would therefore expand the current practice of VSD, and may as a consequence also lead to interesting new insights for the VSD community. The paper concludes that such an outcome-oriented approach of wind turbines and park is worth exploring further, as a supplement to rather than a replacement of the process-oriented approach that is promoted by the current literature on community acceptance of wind parks. (shrink)

Douglas Portmore has recently argued in this journal for a "promising result" – that combining teleological ethics with "evaluator relativism" about the good allows an ethical theory to account for deontological intuitions while "accommodat[ing] the compelling idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available state of affairs." I show that this result is false. It follows from the indexical semantics of evaluator relativism that Portmore's compelling idea is false. I also try to explain what might have (...) led to this misunderstanding. (shrink)

How does the Social Lab methodology support participatory research? This paper provides an evidence-based analysis of experiences of 19 implemented Social Labs applying experiential learning cycles on the question of how to induce Responsible Research and Innovation in the Horizon2020 research funding scheme of the European Commission and beyond. It looks at the potentials of Social Labs to allow participation in research and innovation addressing societal challenges and contrasts empirical results with the theoretical conceptualisation of a scientific Social Lab methodology. (...) It discusses drivers and barriers of engagement, and provides evidence for the impacts of experimental engagement on participation in the context of the labs, substantiated by concrete examples from some of these labs. (shrink)

The capability approach of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen places human capabilities at the centre stage of discussions about justice, equality, development and the quality of life. It rejects too much emphasis on mere preference satisfaction or resource provision and highlights the importance of human agency and freedom. This approach has already significantly influenced different fields of application, such as economics and development studies. Only recently have scholars started to explore its relevance for and application to the area of technology (...) and design, which can be crucial factors in the expansion of human capabilities. How does technology influence human capabilities? What difference could a capability approach make to policies and practices of applying ICT in development processes in the South? How can we criticize and improve the design of technology from the perspective of the capability approach? The authors of this volume explore the implications of the capability approach for technology & design and together create the first volume on this emerging topic. (shrink)

Codes of ethics and conduct typically demand the highest standard of ethical behaviour from every single employee. This implies a democratic or lobbyist understanding of ethics in business. The contrasting view would argue that business ethics is an elitist undertaking that can only be instigated from the top, by managing directors or owner managers. This article looks at three types of ethical businesses, three types of approaches to ethical problem‐solving, and three possible incentives for ethical business to see which of (...) the above is more convincing. It will be argued that the impulse for value‐driven business has to come from the top. Only top management and owner managers have the opportunity to foster major change in business practice. (shrink)

Analytic Philosophy, Volume 63, Issue 2, Page 73-89, June 2022.

A specific mapping mechanism is defined as the basic unit of “Biological Memory”. This mechanism must account for the characteristic frequency patterns in the organic world, where future probability is a function of past experience. The conditions for the function of biological memory are analysed. It is found that asymmetry, and irreversibility as a consequence of complexity, are the basic principles of memory function. The essential asymmetries in genetic memory are pointed out, and the problem of bilateral symmetry in a (...) basically asymmetrical organization is briefly outlined.Complexity is defined in terms of symmetry. The thermodynamic arrow of time and the biological arrow of time are discussed in relation to elementarity and complexity with their specific types of repeatabilities: non-accumulative in the first case and accumulative as a result of “copy-reproduction” by memory in the second case. The application of terminology from Information Theory and Thermodynamics to Memory Mechanics is critically considered.The immediate and inevitable consequences of memory function are shown to be irreversible expansion and irreversible, unpredictable diversification, leading to growing complexity and size on all but the sub-molecular levels of biological structure. (shrink)

Research cannot be done by researchers alone. In most cases, additional resources are required, including human research participants, access to biodiversity for biological and genetic resources, or traditional knowledge. Benefit sharing has been part of global conventions and international ethics guidelines for over 25 years, predicated on the understanding that those who contribute to the research process and its outcomes should share in the benefits as a matter of fairness. This chapter explores the different understandings of benefit sharing in a (...) historical context, from the “Grand Bargain” of the Convention on Biological Diversity in 1992 to the Global Code of Conduct for Research in Resource-Poor Settings in 2018, and examines the contemporary potential for the UN Sustainable Development Goals (Agenda 2030) to facilitate benefit sharing. The discussion provides guidance to researchers, through examples and short case studies, on how to discharge the obligations of benefit sharing effectively and fairly, in pursuit of research integrity. (shrink)

According to a naive view sometimes apparent in the writings of moral philosophers, 'ought' often expresses a relation between agents and actions—the relation that obtains between an agent and an action when that action is what that agent ought to do. It is not part of this naive view that 'ought' always expresses this relation—adherents of the naive view are happy to allow that 'ought' also has an evaluative sense, on which it means, roughly, that were things ideal, some proposition (...) would be the case. What is important to the naive view is that there is also a deliberative sense of 'ought', on which it relates agents to actions. In contrast, logically and linguistically sophisticated philosophers have typically rejected this naive view. According to them, there is no argument-place for an agent in any relation expressed by 'ought', nor is there any argument-place for an action. According to this view, if Jim ought to jam, that is not because there is a special distinctive deliberative ought relation between Jim and jamming; rather, it is because a certain proposition ought to be the case: namely, that Jim jams. This essay defends the naive view, by first arguing that there are two distinct normative senses of 'ought', which actually exhibit different syntactic behavior, and then going on to argue that the deliberative sense of 'ought' relates agents to actions, rather than to propositions. It closes by drawing lessons for a range of issues in moral theory. (shrink)

This volume presents over a decade of work by Mark Schroeder, one of the leading figures in contemporary metaethics. One new and ten previously published papers weave together treatments of reasons, reduction, supervenience, instrumental rationality, and legislation, to explore the nature and limits of moral explanation.

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 67 Heft: 2 Seiten: 265-279.

It is argued that two different types of concept are often intermingled in discussions of Aktionsart. The most common type of classification is one of situation types, relating to the potential actualisation of a situation, although some of the definitions have to do with the actual realization of the situation. This distinction, adequately captured by the notions (a)telicity and (un)boundedness (Declerck 1989), is explored and it is shown how NPs, PPs and tense influence a sentence''s classification as (un)bounded.

In this paper I explore how and why personal identity might be essentially narrative in nature. My topic is the question of personal identity in the strict sense of identity—the question of which person you are, and how that person is extended in space, time, and quality. In this my question appears to contrast with the question of personal identity in the sense sought by teenagers and sufferers of mid-life crises who are trying to ‘find themselves’. But in fact it (...) will be key to my argument that these questions are not distinct and independent. Whereas Parfit was concerned, in his work on personal identity, with how he was extended over time, the teenager who is finding themselves is concerned with how they are extended in quality. Indeed, the core of my argument is that because narrative is the key to understanding how we are extended in quality, and quality is just one more dimension along which we are extended, along with space and time, narrative must also be the clue as to how we are extended in space and time. You, I will argue, are the protagonist in the best story of your life. (shrink)

This paper deals with Popper's little-known work on deductive logic, published between 1947 and 1949. According to his theory of deductive inference, the meaning of logical signs is determined by certain rules derived from ?inferential definitions? of those signs. Although strong arguments have been presented against Popper's claims (e.g. by Curry, Kleene, Lejewski and McKinsey), his theory can be reconstructed when it is viewed primarily as an attempt to demarcate logical from non-logical constants rather than as a semantic foundation for (...) logic. A criterion of logicality is obtained which is based on conjunction, implication and universal quantification as fundamental logical operations. (shrink)

In its essence, post-trial obligations describe a duty by research sponsors to provide a successfully tested drug to research participants who took part in the relevant clinical trials after the trial has been concluded. In some instances,this duty is extended beyond the research participants. This article is divided into three main parts. The first part outlines the legal basis for post-trial obligations by looking at international guidelines, including those issued by the World Medical Association. National legislation is exemplified through resolutions (...) and guidelines issued by Brazil and South Africa respectively. The second part analyses the ethical foundation for post-trial obligations, in particular the attempt to minimize exploitation of research subjects. The third part raises obstacles and challenges for the implementation of post-trial obligations. The jury is still out on whether post-trial obligations in the form of access to drugs for clinical trial participants is the best, or even a good way, to avoid exploitation in medical research. (shrink)

According to the Book of Common Prayer, we have sinned against God “in thought, word, and deed.” In this paper I’ll explore one way of understanding what it might mean to sin against God in thought—the idea that we can at least potentially wrong God by what we believe. I will be interested in the philosophical tenability of this idea, and particularly in its potential consequences for the epistemology of religious belief and the problem of evil.

“Grammar” is Ludwig Wittgenstein's preferred term for the workings of a language: the system of rules that determine linguistic meaning. A philosophical study of language is a study of “grammar”, in this sense, and insofar as any philosophical investigation is concerned with conceptual details, which manifest themselves in language, it is a grammatical investigation. In the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus Wittgenstein offered a mathematical picture of language: presenting language as a calculus. Like a calculus, language was claimed to be governed by syntactic (...) rules: formation rules about the licit combination of names to form elementary propositions; formation rules about the licit combination of elementary propositions to make complex propositions; and finally, truth‐table rules, which enable us to identify logical truths and entailments. Logical grammar, for the young Wittgenstein, is only logical syntax and logical syntax can be determined without paying any attention to the meaning of the signs. (shrink)

Scientists are frequently called upon to “democratize” science, by bringing the public into scientific research. One appealing point for public involvement concerns the nonepistemic values involved in science. Suppose, though, a scientist invites the public to participate in making such value-laden determinations but finds that the public holds values the scientist considers morally unacceptable. Does the argument for democratizing science commit the scientist to accepting the public’s objectionable values, or may she veto them? I argue that there are a limited (...) set of cases in which scientists can, consistently with a commitment to democratized science, set aside the public’s judgments. (shrink)

No School Manifesto' is a book that serves as a key reference and inspiration for people working in (creative) education, ranging from teachers and school leaders at informal, secondary and vocational education and academies to museum educators, artists (in the broadest sense of the word), policy makers, and everyone who supports education and has an interest in developing new perspectives through creativity. No School is a movement that wants to open up the meaning of learning and fundamentally questions traditional education, (...) through creativity. Curiosity, experimentation, unrestricted thinking, making and developing--by yourself and in collaboration with others--are basic elements of all forms of learning and living together. In the current educational system these values are regularly overshadowed by rules, legislation, bureaucracy, a unitary approach, and little attention to the intrinsic inquisitiveness of both the student and the teacher. No School is a growing movement that together with the creative field wants to provide space for experiment, flexibility, cooperation, 'wild' thinking, looking ahead; experimenting off the beaten track with different forms of learning, in which creativity is the key concept. (shrink)